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I. Introduction
Division I football is a popular and profitable business in which the sixty-five universities
that comprise the Power Five Conferences (plus Notre Dame) generated $6.3 billion in revenue
during 2014-15.1 This extremely large amount of revenue would surely not be generated if it
were not for the players providing the athletic service of performing on the field. Are these
players primarily students that are voluntarily offering these services usually in exchange for a
free education? Or are they primarily employees performing said services for their employer and
also gaining an education at the same time?
A number of players from Northwestern University believe that they are the latter and
that they should be considered employees of the University.2 These players brought a challenge
rooted in this belief before the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”). 3 This
article examines that challenge, the ruling of both the regional and federal Boards, and another
recent decision by the NLRB, Columbia.4 Columbia consisted of a similar employee-statusseeking challenge but involved collegiate teaching and research assistants rather than athletes. 5
This article will lay out the Northwestern challenge, the Columbia challenge, how they relate to
one another, how Columbia can possibly aid the Northwestern situation, and what is likely to
come of this topic in the future. This article notes that the employee-seeking challenge for

*J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2018; B.A. Psychology and Political Science, University of
Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2015. Jared currently serves as a research staff writer for the DePaul Sports Law
Journal, and will serve as the Editor-in-Chief during the 2017-18 academic year. Jared would like to sincerely thank
his mentor and the former editor-in-chief, Erica Boos, for her guidance in the creation of this publication.
1
Jon Solomon, Inside College Sports: SEC, Big Ten dominate $100M revenue club, CBS Sports,
http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/inside-college-sports-sec-big-ten-dominate-100m-revenue-club/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017). The “Power Five” conferences are the Big 10 conference, the Big 12 conference, the
Pac-12 conference, the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), and the Southeastern Conference (SEC).
2
Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 (N.L.R.B.).
3
Id.
4
The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York and Graduate Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW,
364 NLRB No. 90 (2016).
5
Id.
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collegiate athletes is currently at a stalemate, and it is predicted that any progress that may occur
in the future will likely come from the individual states.
II. Original Challenge
Approximately eighty-five Northwestern University football players on athletic
scholarship (the “Players”) attempted to obtain representation by a labor organization—the
College Athletes Players Association (“CAPA”)—so they could collectively bargain the terms
and conditions of what would be their employment.6 This attempt involved an area that the
NLRB has never considered: Division I Football.7 According to the challengers however, the
issue involves questions that have been considered and decided by the Board previously.8 Per
the evidentiary record, the Players claimed that they were employees within the meaning of
Section 2(3) of the NLRA, that CAPA was a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5), and that CAPA seeks to represent an appropriate unit.9

In opposition, Northwestern

University argued that Brown University10, another NLRB decision, barred the Players’ attempt
to organize, and in addition, claimed that their challenge violated public policy.11 The decision
of whether these Players were able to organize and collectively bargain turned on whether they
were in fact considered “employees”.12

After analyzing the Players’ duties, the benefits

Northwestern receives from the Players’ services, and the Players’ compensation, the Regional
NLRB determined that the Northwestern Players were in fact “employees.” 13

6

Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 at 2.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.; See also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3), (5).
10
Brown University and Int’l Union et al., 342 NLRB No. 42 (2004)).
11
Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, 2014 WL 1922054 at 3.
12
Id. at 16-17 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995) (“the ordinary dictionary definition of
‘employee’ is any ‘person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation’”)).
13
Id. at 34.
7
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A. The Players’ Duties
According to the Players, football has been called a “year-round gig” at Northwestern, as
players have “extensive mandatory football-related duties that they perform throughout the year,
under the comprehensive control of the coaches.”14 Starting with Training Camp and finishing
with Summer Workouts, the Players invest approximately twenty to thirty hours per week in
football-related activities.15 Northwestern’s own football coach, Patrick Fitzgerald, has been
quoted saying that his Players’ football responsibilities are viewed as a “full-time job.”16 Former
player Kain Colter testified in detail regarding a Northwestern player’s football-related
activities.17 He explained that these activities could be divided into eight periods.18 These
periods are as follows:
i. Training Camp
Players are required to report to training camp in early August, during which time Colter
explained “it’s football every day.”19 The Players participate in activities each day based on the
schedules prepared by the coaching staff, from early in the morning to late in the evening. 20 If
the Players fail to participate in said activities, they are subject to discipline by the coaching
staff.21 A typical day during training camp lasts about fourteen hours, totaling about fifty to sixty
hours per week of football-related activities.22

14

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5-12.
16
Id. at 12
17
Id. at 5.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
15
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ii. Regular Season
Lasting from September through November/early December, the Players devote over
forty hours per week to football-related activities, including work-outs, practices, and games. 23
They are once again provided a detailed schedule of required activities prepared by the
coaches.24 In addition to the requirement of performance during games on Saturdays, the Players
are also required to handle media obligations, adhere to a dress code, and participate in team
activities (such as watching film and strength training).25
iii. Post Season
If the team qualifies for a post-season bowl game, the Players experience an extended
season, with the hours devoted to football-related activities per week similar to that of the
Regular Season.26 The Players are limited in any vacation they may take to see their families due
to the football related conflict, but when they can travel, they must get their travel plans
approved by the coaching staff.27
iv. Winter Workouts
This period begins in mid-January, normally about two weeks after the post-season ends,
and continues until around mid-February.28

During this period, Players participate in

approximately twelve to fifteen hours per week of football-related activities, including strength
and conditioning training.29

23

Id. at 9.
Id. at 6.
25
Id. at 6-7.
26
Id. at 9.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 10.
29
Id.
24

66

DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 13 Issue 1

v. “Winning Edge”
After the Winter Workouts, the Players partake in one week of “Winning Edge.”30
During this period, the Players engage in intense workouts dictated by the coaches. 31 “Winning
Edge” is conducted to prepare the Players to “transition” into football.32 This week requires the
Players to sacrifice about fifteen to twenty hours of time.33
vi. Spring Football
Beginning after “Winning Edge” and continuing until mid-April, the Players participate
in football activities for six days a week, totaling twenty to twenty-five hours per week.34 These
activities consist of practices, meetings with the coaching staff, and weightlifting and
conditioning.35
vii. Spring Workouts
Similar to Winter Workouts, Spring Workouts require players to devote twelve to fifteen
hours per week and runs from about one week after Spring Football ends and continues through
May.36
viii. Summer Workouts
After Spring Workouts, the Players are allowed about one to two weeks of vacation, but
then must report back to campus for Summer Workouts, which consist of twenty to twenty-five
hours per week of football-related activities.37 If a Player is taking a summer class or has a

30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 11.
37
Id.
31
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summer internship that conflicts with the Summer Workouts, he must report early at 5:30 am to
do his assigned workouts.38
B. The Benefits Northwestern Receives from Players’ Services
Being a team in one of the Power Five conferences (the Big Ten), Northwestern
generates significant revenue from its football team.39 Between 2003 and 2012, Northwestern
reported approximately $235 million in revenue generated directly by its football program.40
This revenue creates a five to ten million dollar net profit per year.41 In addition to the revenue
gained from ticket sales and television contracts, Northwestern also profits from selling
merchandise bearing its Players’ names, numbers, and likenesses.42
In addition to the direct monetary benefits Northwestern receives, the school also
capitalizes on indirect benefits attributable to the school’s football program.43 One example,
known as the “Flutie Effect,” is the correlation between athletic success and increased student
applications to the university.44 For example, the Players presented evidence that Northwestern
applications increased by twenty-one percent the academic year following the football season the
team won the Big Ten Championship title and went to the Rose Bowl.45 The Players also
showed the Board that after this successful season, media mentions of Northwestern increased by
one hundred and eighty-five percent, along with alumni donations increasing as well.46

38

Id.
Id. at 12.
40
Id.
41
Id. (quoting Petitioner exhibit 5 at 5-6).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 13.
44
Id. (citing Petitioner exhibit 5 at 7-8); See also Sean Silverthorne, The Flutie Effect: How Athletic Success Boosts
College Applications, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/04/29/the-flutie-effecthow-athletic-success-boosts-college-applications/#2b200fdc6e96 (last visited Apr. 27, 2017).
45
Id.
46
Id.
39

68

DePaul J. of Sports Law, Volume 13 Issue 1

The Players, aiming to be considered employees, additionally pointed to the similarities
of the business model of a Division I (“D-1”) football program to that of professional teams in
the National Football League (“NFL”).47 Essentially, the Players presented the fact that both
types of programs are “in the business of providing sports entertainment through the labor
provided by players, and in both cases the business derives substantial revenue from that labor
through ticket sales, television contracts, merchandise, stadium rights, and other sources.”48 The
Players also posited that, except for the compensation limitation placed upon them by the
NCAA, the economic relationship between the Players and Northwestern closely resembles the
economic relationship between a professional player and his NFL team.49
C. The Players’ Compensation
As compensation for their services to Northwestern’s football team, the Players receive
what is called “athletic aid.”50 This aid consists of up to one hundred percent of the “full-ride
equivalency of $61,063, and covers tuition, room and board, books, and other fees.”51 Most
athletes do not receive a “full-ride”, but in 2013-14, Northwestern granted athletic aid to one
hundred and sixty-nine individuals, eighty-eight of them being football players.52 This aid is
provided to Players explicitly in return for their services to the football team, and can be
“immediately reduced or canceled” if a player becomes ineligible, voluntarily withdraws, or
violates team rules as determined by the coaching staff or the athletic administration.53 These

47

Id. at 13.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 14.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
48
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scholarships are different from non-athletic scholarships in that the latter are provided based on
financial need rather than qualification and require no services from those receiving them.54
D. The Players’ and CAPA’s Argument
Based on the factors laid out above, the Northwestern Players and CAPA (the
“Petitioners”) contended that the Players were statutory employees based on “the common law of
agency.”55 According to the law of agency, as discussed in NLRB v. Town & Country, Inc., an
“employee” is “any person who works for another in return for other compensation.” 56 This
previous NLRB decision stated that, “in the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’
without defining it, [the Supreme Court has] concluded that Congress intended to describe the
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law principles.”57

The

Petitioners contended that the Players perform services under the University’s control, similar to
what a player employed by an NFL team performs.58
First, the Petitioners claimed that the Players provided services that were as extensive as
a full-time job separate from and in addition to the responsibilities of other students.59 Second,
the Petitioners claimed that it is indisputable that the Players’ services were performed for the
University, considering the millions of dollars in revenue attributable solely to the football
program.60 Lastly, the Petitioners contended that the services they provided were completed in
return for payment.61 They pointed to the fact that only “a rudimentary economic relationship” is
required between employee and employer.62

54

Petitioners also pointed out that the Board

Id. at 15-16
Id. at 16
56
Id. (quoting Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 90.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 17.
59
Id. at 18.
60
Id. at 20-21.
61
Id. at 21.
62
Id. (quoting WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 NLRB 1273, 1274 (1998)).
55
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recognized in-kind benefits as compensation just like wages, and by doing so, contended that the
benefits (such as tuition payments and room and board) constituted compensation.63
E. The Regional NLRB’s Decision
After considering Petitioner’s arguments set forth above, the Regional Board determined
that “the extensive and undisputed record shows that Northwestern scholarship football players
are ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA, that CAPA is a labor
organization with [sic] the meaning of Section 2(5), and that CAPA’s petitioned for unit of
scholarship football players is appropriate.”64
III. The Higher NLRB’s Review
After the Regional Board, located in Chicago, found that the Northwestern grant-in-aid
scholarship football players were considered employees, Northwestern University requested the
Higher NLRB to review the Regional Board’s decision.65 The Board noted that even when it has
the statutory authority to act, it has the power to properly decline to do so if it concludes that
asserting jurisdiction over a particular case would not effectuate the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act.66 The Board continued by stating that it has “never been asked to assert
jurisdiction over any type of college athlete, and the scholarship football players do not fit neatly
into any analytical framework that the Board has used in cases involving other types of students
or athletes,” and therefore must determine whether they should exercise its discretion to decline
jurisdiction.67
After an evaluation of the facts, the Board decided to decline jurisdiction due to two main
factors: (1) A decision rendered by them regarding one team would promote instability for the
63

Id.
Id. at 34.
65
Northwestern University, 362 NLRB No. 167 at 1 (2015).
66
Id. at 3.
67
Id. at 3-4.
64
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NCAA and conferences in controlling each team; and (2) The fact that the FBS consists mostly
of public institutions suggests that a Board decision regarding this one school would promote
instability.68
A. The Nature of League Sports and the NCAA’s Oversight Renders Individual
Team Bargaining Problematic69
The Board noted that the NCAA exists to, among other things, set common rules and
standards governing their competitions, and exerts a substantial amount of control over the
operations of individual teams, including areas in which the Northwestern Players attempt to
collectively bargain.70 The Board noted that a “symbiotic relationship” exists between the
various teams, the conferences, and the NCAA.71 As a result, the Board stated, “labor issues
directly involving only an individual team and its players would also affect the NCAA, the Big
Ten, and the other member institutions.”72 Consequently, the Board stated, any ruling applied to
one team would have ramifications for other teams, and that “‘it would be difficult to imagine
any degree of stability in labor relations’ if we were to assert jurisdiction in this single-team
case.”73 The Board concluded that such a decision is unprecedented, as all previous Board
decisions concerning professional sports involved league-wide bargaining units.74
B. The Structure of the FBS and the Nature of Most Colleges Within It Renders a
Team Specific Ruling Problematic75
The Board noted that of all the universities that participate in FBS football, all but
seventeen are state-run institutions.76 As a result, the Board noted that it could not assert
68

Id. at 5.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 4.
72
Id. at 5.
73
Id. (quoting North American Soccer League, 236 NLRB 1317, 1321-22 (1978)).
74
Id. at 5.
75
Id.
69
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jurisdiction over the vast majority of FBS teams because they are not operated by “employers”
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.77

The Board also noted that, specifically,

Northwestern is the only school in the Big Ten that is a private institution, and that it could not
assert jurisdiction over any of Northwestern’s primary competitors.78 The Board determined that
because most FBS schools are state-run institutions, they are subject to state labor laws, which at
least in a few cases, expressly state by statute that scholarship athletes are not employees.79
Because this issue creates an “inherent asymmetry” of the labor relations, the Board determined
that asserting jurisdiction would not promote but would rather hinder stability in labor
relations.80
C. Board’s Note as to its Decision
Although the Board declined to assert jurisdiction, it stated a few disclaimers in
accordance with the topic being brought up in the future.81 Namely, the Board noted that its
decision to decline jurisdiction was purely based on the facts in the specific record before it, and
“that subsequent changes in the treatment of scholarship players could outweigh the
considerations that motivate [their] decision . . . .”82 In issuing its conclusion regarding its
decision to deny jurisdiction, the Board specifically stated that it did not decide whether the
scholarship players are employees or not under Section 2(3).83 Additionally, the Board stated
that, “we therefore do not address what the Board’s approach might be to a petition for all FBS

76

Id. at 8.
Id. at 5; See Big East Conference, 282 NLRB 335, 340 (1986).
78
Id. at 5.
79
Id. at 6; See Ohio Rev. Code § 3345.56; Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.201(1)(e)(iii) (covering Big Ten members Ohio
State University, University of Michigan, and Michigan State University).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
77
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scholarship football players (or at least those at private colleges and universities).”84 Lastly, as a
final note, the Board stated that its decision to decline jurisdiction “does not preclude a
reconsideration of this issue in the future”, and that if “[their] conclusions regarding jurisdiction
warrant reassessment, the Board may revisit its policy in this area.” 85 It is this final section of
notes that left this topic open for reconsideration, and with the recent case discussed below,
Columbia, this topic could and might be revisited in the future.
IV. The Columbia Decision
In an August 23, 2016 hearing, the NLRB was faced with the challenge of whether
students who perform services at a university in connection with their studies are statutory
employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. 86 The case
was originally filed and heard in 2015, in which the Regional Director applied Brown University
and dismissed the petition of the graduate workers to be considered employees. 87 The Federal
Board granted review and decided to overrule Brown, claiming that that Board erred as to a
matter of statutory interpretation.88 In Brown, the Board held that graduate assistants cannot be
statutory employees because they “are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not
economic, relationship with their university.”89 In disagreeing with this analysis, the Board in
Columbia determined that it indeed had the statutory authority to consider student assistants as
employees, and in fact held that “student assistants who have a common-law employment
relationship with their university are statutory employees under the Act.”90 The Board then

84

Id.
Id.
86
Columbia, 364 NLRB No. 90 at 1.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. (quoting Brown University, 342 NLRB No. 42 at 487.
90
Id. at 1-2.
85
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applied this general rule to the specific facts laid out by the Columbia petitioners and accordingly
reversed the Regional Board’s decision.91
A. The Brown and New York University Decisions
Before one can examine the Columbia decision, one must look to the precedent and
previous decisions that came before Columbia. Chronologically, the NLRB first determined in
NYU that university graduate assistants were in fact statutory employees.92 Then, four years later
in Brown, the NLRB overruled NYU and determined that student graduate assistants were not
statutory employees.93 Hence, the Columbia Board was faced with an issue that has already been
discussed on multiple occasions and reversed once.
i. The New York University Decision
In NYU, the Board examined the statutory language of Section 2(3) and the common law
agency doctrine of the master-servant relationship.94

This doctrine states that “such a

‘relationship exists when a servant performs services for another, under the other’s control or
right of control, and in return for payment.’”95

Examining this doctrine, the NYU Board

determined that “ample evidence exists to find that graduate assistants plainly and literally fall
within the meaning of “employee” as defined in Section 2(3).”96 In so ruling, the Board looked
to the “breadth of the statutory language, the lack of any statutory exclusion for graduate
assistants, and the undisputed facts establishing that the assistants in that case performed services
under the control and direction of the university for which they were compensated.”97

91

Id. at 2.
See New York University and Int’l Union et al., 332 NLRB 1205 (2000).
93
See Brown, 342 NLRB No. 42.
94
Columbia, 364 NLRB at 3; See NYU, 332 NLRB at 1206.
95
Columbia, 364 NLRB at 3 (quoting NYU, 332 NLRB at 1206).
96
Id.
97
Columbia, 364 NLRB at 3.
92
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ii. The Brown University Decision
In 2004, the NLRB reassessed the question of whether graduate students are considered
employees and, in a highly contested decision, overruled NYU.98 In doing so, the Board in
Brown invoked what it deemed the “’underlying fundamental premise of the Act,’ i.e. that the
Act is ‘designed to cover economic relationships.’”99 Additionally, the Brown Board stated that
it would not exercise jurisdiction “over relationships that are ‘primarily educational.’” 100 More
specifically, the Board stated that a fundamental tenant of the Act and a prerequisite to statutory
coverage was that the employee-employer relationship must be primarily economic in
character.101 Lastly, the Board supported the finding of a previous Board decision, which stated
that “collective bargaining is not particularly well suited to educational decision making and that
any change in emphasis from quality education to economic concerns will ‘prove detrimental to
both labor and educational policies.’”102 Being a contested decision, there were numerous
dissenters, who primarily relied on the fact that “‘collective bargaining by graduate student
employees’ was ‘increasingly a fact of American university life’ and described the majority’s
decision as ‘woefully out of touch with contemporary academic reality.’”103
B. Reversing Brown
The Columbia Board began its discussion by analyzing how the term “employee” should
be interpreted in light of Section 2(3) of the Act.104 The Board pointed out that the Supreme
Court has shown that the “’phrasing of the Act seems to reiterate the breadth of the ordinary
dictionary definition of the term’, a definition that ‘includes any “person who works for another

98

Id.; See also Brown, 342 NLRB No. 42.
Id. (quoting Brown, 342 NLRB at 483,488).
100
Id. (quoting Brown, 342 NLRB at 488).
101
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original); See also Brown, 342 NLRB No. 42).
102
Id. at 3 (citing St. Clare’s Hospital, 229 NLRB 1000, 1002 (1977)).
103
Id. at 4 (citing Brown, 342 NLRB at 493 (Liebman and Walsh, dissenting).
104
See 29 U.S.C.§ 152(3).
99
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in return for financial or other compensation.”’”105 The Board did note that the Act does not
directly define the term “employee,” nor addresses students or university employees of any
sort.106 However, the Board noted that the legislative history of the Act, paired with the design
of the Act itself, prove that the Brown Board erred.107
The Columbia Board, looking at the “underlying fundamental purpose of the Act,”
rejected the Brown Board claim that considering student assistants statutory employees cannot
with reconciled with the Act.108 Rather, the Board claimed that “[t]he Act is designed to cover a
particular type of ‘economic relationship’—an employment relationship—and where that
relationship exists, there should be compelling reasons before the Board excludes a category of
workers from the Act’s coverage.”109 This compelling reason, according to the Board, did not
exist regarding the exclusion of student employees.110 The Board continued, stating that the
Brown Board’s main mistake was “fram[ing] the issue of statutory coverage not in terms of the
existence of an employment relationship, but rather on whether some other relationship between
the employee and the employer is the primary one—a standard neither derived from the statutory
text of Section 2(3) nor from the fundamental policy of the Act.” 111 The Columbia Board stated
that this “primary vs. secondary” education employment relationship is irrelevant, and unless
considering student assistants employees violates public policy, coverage should in fact extend to
them.112

105

Columbia, 364 NLRB at 4 (quoting NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995) (quoting
American Heritage Dictionary 604 (3d ed. 1992)) (emphasis added).
106
Columbia, 364 NLRB at 5-6.
107
Id. at 6.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 6-7.
111
Id. at 7.
112
Id.
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In examining public policy in regards to this decision, the Columbia Board concluded
that “affording student assistants the right to engage in collective bargaining will further the
policies of the Act, without endangering any cognizable, countervailing harm to private higher
education.”113

Accordingly, the Board overruled Brown and held that, generally, student

assistants who have a common-law employment relationship with their respective university are
considered statutory employees entitled to the protections of the Act.114
C. Application of this Rule to the Columbia Facts
The Board applied this new standard to the facts presented to it and concluded:
(1) that all of the petitioned-for student-assistant classifications consist of
statutory employees; (2) that the petitioned-for bargaining unit (comprising
graduate students, terminal Master’s degree students, and undergraduate students)
is an appropriate unit; and (3) that none of the petitioned-for classifications
consists of temporary employees who must be excluded from the unit by virtue of
the limited length of their employment.115
i. Facts of the Case
Columbia University is a nonprofit educational institution located in New York City.116
Graduate students at Columbia are selected by the faculty of the academic departments on the
basis of academic prowess, based on educational background and standardized test scores. 117 In
general, PhD. students spend five to nine years of study within their discipline, during which
they take courses, prepare a doctoral thesis, and are usually required to teach as well to obtain
their degree.118 Columbia fully funds most PhD student assistants, typically through tuition and
a stipend.119 Usually, taking on teaching or research duties is a condition for such funding.120

113

Id. at 14.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 13.
117
Id. at 15.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 14.
114
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The nature of teaching duties for a teacher’s assistant varies. 121 Columbia’s Teaching
Assistants (“TA’s”), known as Instructional Officers, fall into various subsidiary categories such
as undergraduate assistant, master’s degree assistant, and PhD. assistant, all of which involve
varying levels of discretion and involvement in course design.122 Instructional Officers generally
work up to twenty hours per week, and typically participate for one to two semesters at a time.123
Duties include grading papers, holding office hours, leading discussions or laboratory sessions,
or even assuming one hundred percent of the teaching duties for a given course.124
Graduate and Departmental Research Assistants, on the other hand, are graduate students
that generally participate in research rather than teaching.125 Their research is either funded by
outside grants or by the university itself.126 Both types of Assistants carry out research that will
ultimately be presented as part of a thesis.127 “Teaching and research occur with the guidance of
a faculty member or under the direction of an academic department.”128
ii. Instructional Officers
The Board noted that “common-law employment . . . generally requires that the employer
have the right to control the employee’s work, and that the work be performed in exchange for
compensation.”129 This, the Board claimed, is present in regard to Instructional Officers.130 To
start, the University directs and oversees the student’s teaching activities, and if they are not
performed correctly, the students are subject to corrective counseling or removal.131

121

Id. at 15.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 14.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 17.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
122
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Additionally, Instructional Officers receive compensation for the services provided, namely
tuition assistance and a cash stipend.132 The Board contended that, “while overlooked by the
Brown University Board, there is undoubtedly a significant economic component to the
relationship between universities, like Columbia, and their student assistants.”133 Based on these
factors, the Columbia Board found “no difficulty” in finding that all of the petitioned-for
Instructional Officers comprise statutory employees. 134
iii. Student Research Assistants
Regarding Student Research Assistants, Columbia argued that they have no common-law
employment relationship with the University, and based their argument on a previous
determination in Leland Stanford, which claimed that externally funded research assistants were
not employees.135 In applying the new standard adopted, the Columbia Board found the “core
elements of the reasoning in Leland Stanford [as] no longer tenable.”136 The Board concluded
that Leland Stanford relied on the “primary vs. secondary” relationship requirement rather than
the common-law standard and overruled it along with Brown.137
Using this new common-law standard rather than the previous standard used in Leland
Stanford and Brown, the Board determined that because Columbia “exerts the requisite control
over the research assistant’s work, and specific work is performed as a condition of receiving the
financial award, a research assistant is properly treated as an employee under the Act.”138
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V. Application of Columbia to the FBS
With the recent Columbia ruling, a new criterion has been created for determining
whether one is an employee or not, and an application of it to the Northwestern challenge is
inevitable. Columbia re-established the common-law employment relationship as the relevant
test in determining whether one is considered an employee.139 On its face, Columbia helps the
Northwestern Players, allowing them to make progress in one day being considered employees.
However, when looking deeper and analyzing Columbia in conjunction with the Board’s
decision to deny jurisdiction, the Players will find themselves paralyzed in the same
predicament.
A. The New Standard
When just looking at the new standard adopted by the Columbia Board, it is hard to
determine that the Northwestern Players would not be considered employees, as numerous
similarities exist between the Players and the Instructional Officers/Research Assistants in
Columbia.140 Since the Northwestern Players, and collegiate athletes at large, form a commonlaw employee-employer relationship with their school in which they perform a service under the
control of the University in exchange for compensation, it can be predicted that based on this
test, they are considered statutory employees.141
To start, like the petitioners in Columbia, the Players also receive compensation in
exchange for providing services to the University. 142 Similar to the service of assisting in the
process of teaching or researching, playing football for the school and against other schools can
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See Columbia, 364 NLRB No. 90 at 19-21; See also Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner College Athletes Players
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be considered a service, as it also requires sacrifice and hard work. Also, again similar to the
petitioners in Columbia, the payment the Players receive is not a traditional form of
compensation, but rather takes the form of tuition help and a stipend.143 The Columbia Board
considered this type of compensation acceptable for the Instructional Officers and Research
Assistants, so it can therefore be predicted that another Board would likewise approve of the
Players’ compensation.144
Next, analogous to the petitioners in Columbia, the Players provide their services under
the direction of the University and are subject to removal if they do not comply with the
standards set by the school.145 Both sets of petitioners have responsibilities that restrict them
from simply pursuing their educational goals at their own discretion, and must adhere to the
discretion of their university-funded superiors.146 This similarity shows that the Players also
have their respective services controlled by their “employer,” the University.
Lastly, the services provided by the Players produce many benefits for the school, just
like that of the petitioners in Columbia.147 The benefits created by the Instructional Officers and
Research Assistants included both the instruction of the undergraduate students of the school,
which the Columbia Board considered a “salient economic character,” as well as the direct
economic benefit of the increase of research grants brought in by Research Assistants.148
Similarly, Division I football players bring in substantial amounts of revenue for their respective
schools, even to a much larger extent than the petitioners in Columbia.149 If something as salient
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as educating undergraduate students can qualify as an economic benefit to a school, then the
millions of dollars produced by collegiate athletes surely will qualify.
B. The Still-Existing Problem
Because of the similarities discussed above, it seems that the Columbia decision can
bridge the gap between collegiate football players and the prospect of being considered
employees. However, a major problem still exists: before the NLRB can rule whether they are
considered employees or not, they must assert jurisdiction and review the case in the first
place.150 Although the Columbia decision proves to be a prediction that football players will be
deemed employees, the fact remains that the NLRB can still only assert jurisdiction over a small
minority of Division I schools, therefore causing instability in the event of a NLRB ruling.151
This instability idea, which was the main reason the NLRB declined jurisdiction for the
Northwestern players, has not been minimized by the Columbia decision.152
C. Moving Forward
Despite not solving the major problem of instability creating a basis to decline
jurisdiction, the Columbia decision did affect the criteria of when one is considered an employee
in the University realm.153 Therefore, it can be predicted that this issue will resurface again.
Instead of having the problem of jurisdiction in addition to the problem of whether student
athletes are employees, Columbia has resolved the latter, leaving only the former standing in the
way of collegiate athletes becoming employees. This all but guarantees that this topic will be
once again considered in the future, with both teams and players’ associations attempting to
bypass this jurisdiction issue.
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Because the overwhelming majority of Division I football programs are located at public
universities, the next step forward may have to begin with actions taking place at the state level
rather than the national level.154 Since most universities in the Big Ten and other Power 5
conferences are indeed public, the possibility of student-athletes unionizing at those universities
rests upon the decision of the states in which those schools are located. 155 Some states have
statutes that explicitly state that student-athletes are not employees.156 Student-athletes in such
states attempting to unionize may have the most difficulty in doing so.
However, other states take a more lenient stance, while others have not taken a position at
all.157

In his article, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, Steven Willborn

discusses this idea, most notably the fact that Florida offered a ruling parallel to the reasoning of
Columbia before such decision was even decided.158

Willborn also discusses the state of

California and how it has a public-sector collective bargaining law that would grant studentathletes explicit protection as employees, as long as “the services they provide are unrelated to
their educational objectives, or that those educational objectives are subordinate to the services
they perform.”159 Therefore, public university student-athletes in both Florida and California
stand in the same position as the Northwestern players discussed here.
Based on the previous decision, it is likely that they are considered employees, yet a lack
of continuity hinders an official decision in so ruling. Having Florida and California on the side
154
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Id. at 92-94 (quoting Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 3562(e) (West
2010).
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of unionization will certainly help the Players’ cause, as those two states together have a
combined fourteen Division I football programs.160 Hypothetically speaking, if those two states,
along with the NLRB who has jurisdiction over private universities, were to approve studentathletes as employees, there would be a total of twenty-eight schools under the jurisdiction of
that decision.161 This may seem like a good amount, but in comparison to the total of one
hundred and twenty-eight Division I football schools, one hundred schools would be without
jurisdiction.162 This large number of schools outside of such jurisdiction would likely still keep
this hypothetical decision from happening in the first place. If a mass movement of the decision
to unionize collegiate athletes were to take place, however, other states would have to sign on.
In his article, Willborn discusses the fact that thirty-four states have not issued a decision
or statute showing an opinion with regard to this issue.163 This vast number of states that are
essentially undecided shows some promise for a possible collegiate athlete unionization
movement. In fact, Nicholas Fram and T. Ward Frampton noted in their article about studentathlete unionization that twelve states, in addition to Florida and California, have issued rulings
that “support the contention that student-athletes would also qualify as statutory ‘employees.’”164
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Additionally, Fram and Frampton also discuss that only thirteen states specifically do not extend
collective bargaining rights to any public employee.165 Because of this specific restriction, it is
extremely unlikely that student-athletes in those states will be afforded the ability to unionize
without a statutory change. Despite this, because a number of the other thirty-seven states
support employee-determining tests that collegiate athletes can pass, a majority of states
supporting student-athlete-employees is definitely possible in the future.
However, despite this positive outlook, almost all of these thirty-seven states still have
not explicitly ruled on the subject.166 Although the door is open for such a ruling to occur, and
that such a ruling would likely be favorable to student-athletes in those states, until an actual
ruling happens, this analysis is merely speculation. Alone, a tendency to rule a certain way will
not be sufficient for the NLRB to issue jurisdiction or allow for student-athletes to be protected
at the state level. What these above mentioned states do in response to this issue receiving
national attention should be monitored closely, as a few states ruling that student-athletes are
employees may be the push needed to get the wheels turning in order to overcome the dubious
inconsistency problem.
So, moving forward, what is likely to occur? From a realistic standpoint, it is very
unlikely that student-athletes will be fully considered employees. Although they can satisfy the
common-law economic employer-employee relationship articulated in Columbia, the Players,
along with other student-athletes nationwide, will be unlikely to achieve employee status because
of the lack of support this movement will receive.
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Based on its ruling to reserve the ability to re-try and possibly reconsider its decision, the
NLRB seems to be intrigued by this movement, but is paralyzed due to its short reach.167
Therefore, for anything to really be changed, the classification of a student-athlete-employee
must be commenced by either the NCAA or the respective states. It is very unlikely that the
NCAA endorses such classification, as they would stand to lose much power if such a ruling
were to occur. If collegiate athletes were considered employees and could collectively bargain,
they could request higher compensation, better safety accommodations, better living
accommodations, and much more.168 In response, the NCAA would have to hear and probably
accommodate such requests, as the athletes would have much stronger footing and would even
have the ability to go on strike, therefore harming the NCAA monetarily. Because such a ruling
would only weaken the NCAA’s power and strengthen the power of the athletes, it is almost
certain that the NCAA would not support such a movement. For the same reasons as the NCAA,
each individual school would likely oppose such movement as well.
This leaves the states.

Hypothetically, if numerous states ruled student-athletes as

employees to the point that a majority of Division I football programs consisted of so-considered
employees, the NLRB could then have a valid basis for re-assessing its decision in Northwestern.
If that were to occur, the Board would likely lean on its reasoning in Columbia and therefore
would almost certainly analogize collegiate athletes to TA’s.
Northwestern and Columbia have created a situation that can be fittingly described by a
routine football play. Consider a typical game of football, eleven men on offense versus eleven
men on defense. Collegiate athletes nationwide are represented by the running back in this
situation, with the end zone appropriately representing the ruling that classifies student-athletes
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as employees. The play is a typical hand-off to the running back around mid-field, since it is the
responsibility of such athletes to prove that they are employees. Scoring a touchdown on a
running play from midfield is unlikely, but not impossible, which reflects the difficulty the
collegiate athletes face in attempting to unionize. In this situation, the Northwestern NLRB
decision to decline jurisdiction is the run-stopping personnel on defense—the defensive line and
linebackers. They present the best shot at stopping the running back, and will likely do so before
the running back reaches the end zone. However, the running back can be aided by the offensive
line—the respective states. If the states pass legislation or rule through the court system that
student athletes are employees, they might hypothetically create the blocking needed for the
running back to get through the run stopping defenders and therefore grant the NLRB the
opportunity to issue jurisdiction. If this were to occur, all the running back would have to do is
get past the defensive secondary to reach the end zone.
In this hypothetical scenario, the secondary is represented by Columbia. Even though the
NLRB may issue jurisdiction, the Players must still prove that they are employees in accordance
with the common law standard laid out in Columbia. However, if the case gets to that point, the
Players will likely succeed in so proving. Therefore, because Columbia will offer little-to-no
resistance in the Players’ employment efforts, if the Players are able to achieve jurisdiction, they
will likely be considered employees, much like a running back will likely score if bursting ahead
into the defensive secondary with a full head of steam.
The X-factor in this whole situation is the individual states. Much like how a running
back will likely not score a touchdown without good blocking, jurisdiction will likely never be
asserted over this matter without concrete approval by the states first.
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D. Future Uncertainty
It is hard to tell what exactly the future holds for collegiate athletes attempting to
unionize. However, because of the jurisdiction-based stalemate created by Northwestern, the
next action likely to occur will be from the states themselves. If that were to take place and
NLRB jurisdiction was eventually asserted, Columbia will certainly be a factor, likely aiding the
student-athletes in achieving employee status.
However, collegiate athletes being considered employees could have at least one serious
negative implication. As of now, scholarships are not considered gross income and are taxfree.169 But if student athletes are considered employees instead of students, this large amount of
money given to them may become susceptible to a large tax burden.170 In his comment, Patrick
Johnston discusses this possibility, stating that if the Northwestern Players claim that they are
first providing athletic services rather than primarily being students, the IRS could very well
determine that the scholarships given to the athletes are not aid for school but for these services
performed, and are therefore taxable income.171 If this determination were to occur, a player
receiving a typical scholarship would have to pay over $15,000 per year in state and federal
taxes.172
This additional financial burden is not the only issue this tax situation creates, either.
Johnston discusses how this issue may also cause a competitive imbalance based on state income
taxes.173 Since all states are free to choose the amount of income tax they charge, players being
taxed on their scholarships would be more likely to attend universities in states with more
169
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favorable or no income taxes, thereby consolidating talent into states like Texas and Florida, to
the detriment of states with high income taxes, like New York and Ohio.174 This imbalance
could also have a negative impact on revenue streams for schools in these high income tax states,
thereby causing damage to not only the competitive aspect of Division I football but also to
individual schools as well.175
This negative effect of determining collegiate athletes as employees can easily be
overlooked and should definitely be considered by any team of athletes attempting to be so
considered, including the football team at Northwestern.

If they learned of this possible

repercussion, they may in fact reconsider pushing to get NLRB jurisdiction and may be happy
accepting their scholarship tax-free as it currently is. Student-athletes around the country should
consider this and other consequences before attempting to achieve employee status and in fact
should “be careful what they wish for.”176
VI. Conclusion
This article’s purpose was to inform the reader of the challenge brought by the
Northwestern football team and the NLRB decisions relating to it; to describe the Columbia
decision; and to relate said decision to the Northwestern challenge and how it can effect that
cause moving forward.

Unfortunately for the proponents of student-athletes becoming

employees, Columbia does not assist in overcoming the jurisdiction problem noted by the
Federal NLRB.

However, if this problem can be circumvented, Columbia provides much

assistance to these proponents, as that decision re-adopted the common law employer-employee
relationship as the standard in determining who is an employee. Under this standard, collegiate
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athletes can surely pass as employees, just as the teaching and research assistants did in
Columbia.
However, this article discussed an easily overlooked but important consequence of
student-athletes achieving employee status—the fact that their scholarships will likely no longer
be tax-free. This consequence, along with any others, should be seriously evaluated before any
more challenges are made. Overall, Columbia works to help the proponents of collegiate athleteemployees, but does not provide a solution for the overarching jurisdictional issue that the NLRB
noted. What will occur in the future, if anything significant, is difficult to predict, but any next
step in the progress of this cause will likely come from individual states.

